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MANAGING COMPLEXITY AND UNCERTAINTY IN REGIONAL GOVERNANCE 
NETWORKS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF STATE RESCALING IN ENGLAND 
 
ABSTRACT 
Network management is viewed as a way of dealing with uncertainty in complex policy 
networks but little is known about the types of network management strategies employed by 
regional actors to manage vertical and horizontal relations. Two central questions guide this 
paper (i) What network management strategies were employed to manage complexity and 
uncertainty in regional governance networks in England? (ii) How can past lessons be 
harnessed to inform future network strategies for managing territorial networks? The paper 
concludes that regional network management strategies were effective in securing ‘process’ 
outcomes but that ‘content’ outcomes, in the form of genuine discretion over policy, were 
unattainable without the authorization of central government.  
 
KEY WORDS: regions, decentralization, England, complexity, network management 
strategies, network outcomes 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Continuity, stability and reciprocity are important features for effective collaborative 
governance. However, territorial governance in England is characterized by a high degree of 
volatility and uncertainty. During the 1990s a regional administrative tier was introduced in 
England, in keeping with the predominant European pattern of state rescaling (MARKS et al., 
2008). However, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government elected in May 
2010 has eschewed the regional levelin favour of a radical ‘localist’ agenda in which functions 
and budgets will be devolved to local authorities and communities (PICKLES, 2010). These 
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new and emerging policy networks will operate at a different geographical scale but will face 
many of the same challenges as their regional predecessors. This constant political and 
institutional repositioning has led to a high degree of uncertainty that could undermine the 
longevity required to establish robust sub-national partnerships. KOPPENJAN and KLIJN 
(2004) suggest that network management offers a way to deal with uncertainty in complex 
policy networks and, if enacted effectively, can have a positive influence on network outcomes. 
However, little is known about the effectiveness of network management strategies being 
employed by regional actors in attempts to manage vertical and horizontal relationships 
(RETHEMEYER and HATMAKER, 2010; SOTARAUTA, 2010). Two central questions 
guide this paper (i) What network management strategies were effective (and ineffective) in 
managing complexity and uncertainty in regional governance networks in England? (ii) How 
can past lessons be harnessed to inform future network strategies for managing territorial 
networks?  
 
This paper explores these questions through a detailed analysis of a particular policy initiative 
- the Regional Funding Allocation (RFA) process in England. Introduced in 2005, RFAs were 
intended to ‘enhance regional input into government policy development, showing how such 
priorities relate to each other to form a coherent, credible and strategic vision for improving 
the economic performance of regions’ (HM TREASURY et al., 2005, p. 3). For the first time 
major funding streams for economic development, housing, transport, and latterly skills were 
examined jointly by key regional partners to promote a more cohesive approach to the long-
term management of resources. This policy initiative offers a fruitful avenue to explore regional 
network management strategies because it epitomizes the difficulties in negotiating territorial 
policy solutions with central government and managing horizontal relationships across 
multiple agencies and policy sectors. Moreover, it took place at a time of unprecedented levels 
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of uncertainty in regional governance arrangements, highlighted by a number of key factors. 
First, there was a lack of consensus in Whitehall about the intended trajectory of English 
regionalism (AYRES and STAFFORD, 2009). Second, the Government’s failed attempt to 
introduce elected regional assemblies in 2004 prompted sustained challenges to ‘the region’ as 
an effective territorial scale for policy development (HARRISON, 2007). Third, in 2007 the 
Government announced the Sub-national Review (HM TREASURY et al., 2007) which set out 
reforms to reconfigure governance structures for managing economic development and 
regeneration at the sub-national level. Fourth, the looming 2010 General Election threatened a 
change in government and with it the possibility of the removal of the regional administrative 
tier in England (CONSERVATIVE PARTY, 2009). Finally, the global financial crisis resulted 
in significant public spending cuts that undermined existing government commitments to 
spending priorities in the regions (GREER, 2010).  
 
Our findings are based on detailed case studies in two English regions (the North East and 
South East) and a web based survey in the remaining six regions outside London. 
KOPPENJAN and KLIJN’s (2004) Actor, Game and Network analysis has been employed as 
a methodological framework to provide a map of the policy environment and a rich description 
of regional governance arrangements. The paper is divided into six sections. Following this 
introduction, the next section outlines territorial governance arrangements in the English 
regions and the actors and objectives evident in the Regional Funding Allocation process. 
Section three draws on the policy networks literature to provide a framework for exploring 
regional relationships, including the types of network management strategies that might be 
employed and potential network outcomes that may be achieved. The fourth section provides 
details of the methodology employed in this study while the fifth explores the specific 
challenges facing regional actors, the network management strategies employed to manage 
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relationships and a critique on their effectiveness. The paper concludes by reflecting on the 
scope for lesson drawing and how past lessons might be harnessed to inform future governance 
reforms.      
 
TERRITORIAL GOVERNANCE IN THE ENGLISH REGIONS  
 
Under the New Labour government (1997-2010) the English regional tier grew in institutional 
size and complexity. It had, however, evolved as the result of a ‘mish-mash’ of top-down 
decentralizing initiatives and bottom-up coordinating programmes - what STOKER (2005, p. 
158) refers to as ‘New Labour's rather chaotic top-down approach to decentralization’. In its 
first term (1997-2002) Labour’s regional experiment centred on the activities of three key 
regional bodies. First, Whitehall strengthened its ability to coordinate central government 
policy in the regions by enhancing the role and remit of the Government’s Regional Offices 
(GOs). Second, reflecting a wider ‘global trend’ towards devolution (RODRIGUEZ-POSE and 
GILL, 2005) and the assumption that effective regional governance could play an important 
role in promoting economic productivity and growth (GOODWIN et al., 2005), business-led 
Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) were appointed to prepare and deliver Regional 
Economic Strategies (RESs). Third, unelected Regional Assemblies, comprising 
representatives from local authorities and other economic and social interests, were established 
to scrutinize the RDAs and provide a semblance of regional democracy. This ‘institutional 
troika’ was expected to work together and also interact with the extensive group of central 
government bodies with a regional presence, local authorities, sub-regional partnerships and 
business and community bodies that constituted the system of governance in the English 





There were, however, differing views in Whitehall about what roles and functions regions 
should acquire. Persuaded by the mantra of ‘new regionalism’ (KEATING, 1998), the Treasury 
saw the English regions as the prime site for promoting economic development. Others, most 
notably the then Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott, viewed regions as an opportunity to 
enhance democratic accountability by bringing decision making closer to the people and 
tackling regional economic disparities. Moreover, aside from the economic Vs democracy 
debate, there were parts of Whitehall and the Cabinet that had no interest in the regional tier at 
all. This ‘differentiated response’ to regionalism in Whitehall (AYRES and PEARCE, 2004) 
undermined a coherent constitutional settlement from the start and made it hugely difficult for 
regional actors to engage with departments with competing agendas and varying levels of 
enthusiasm for regional working.    
 
In 2002 the Government announced plans to further strengthen the regional tier and opened the 
way for elected regional government. The White Paper, Your Region, Your Choice (CABINET 
OFFICE and DTLR, 2002) presented a ‘twin-track’ approach, involving enhanced 
administrative decentralization for all regions and moves to elected regional government where 
supported in public referendums. Nonetheless, the proposed powers and resources of elected 
regional assemblies were modest, reflecting a lack of genuine commitment to devolution in 
parts of government. Consequently, the proposals failed to galvanize sufficient support in the 
first public referendum in the North East in 2004, which derailed the Government’s plans for 
political devolution in England. This opened a lively debate in which different stakeholders 
offered alternative solutions to the ‘English Question’ (HAZELL, 2006). The Government 
responded by enhancing the responsibilities of the regional tier through promoting local 
flexibilities in the context of national performance incentives (HM TREASURY and 
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CABINET OFFICE, 2004), acknowledging the important role of the regions in achieving 
policy integration (DTI et al., 2006) and providing regions with greater discretion over 
expenditure and taking account of priorities expressed by regional stakeholders.  
 
Regional Funding Allocations (RFAs) formed part of this drive to strengthen the regions under 
administrative decentralization as opposed to the political devolution that might have been 
afforded by elected regional government. Under the RFA scheme, indicative budget allocations 
for economic development, housing and transport policy were identified for the 2005-08 
spending review period. In addition, the Government spelt out longer term planning 
assumptions of the amount of funding that was likely to be made available in these core policy 
areas over the following ten years. Regional partners, including representatives of the GOs, 
RDAs and Regional Assemblies were invited to jointly prepare advice to ministers on how 
these allocations should be spent. They were also asked to consider the scope for vireing (or 
transferring) allocations between budget headings, where this would assist integration. An 
option to defer funding was also granted so that money could be combined with future planned 
investment to deliver large scale projects that benefit the region (HM TREASURY et al., 2005; 
2008).  
 
The significance of RFAs lay in the opportunity it offered to challenge the silo or ‘blow pipe’ 
funding (HEALD and SHORT, 2002) emanating from Whitehall and to coordinate investment 
at the sub-national level. However, RFAs were not the first attempt by government to promote 
more flexible budgets. In April 2002 a ‘single pot’ of funding was introduced for RDAs, which 
brought together the separate budgets of the Departments for Environment, Transport and the 
Regions (DETR) and Education and Employment (DfEE). The RDAs were granted some 
flexibility to vire resources between programmes, subject to their meeting ‘stretching outcome 
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and output targets to ensure their activities deliver their strategic goals, matching flexibility 
with greater accountability’ (HM TREASURY, 2000, para 3.67). While offering some scope 
for fiscal autonomy, the ability of the ‘single pot’ to counteract Whitehall targets and funding 
commitments was marginal. RFAs were viewed by government as an attempt to build on the 
single pot process by involving more government funding streams and promoting greater 
involvement from a range of regional and local actors. Government guidance on RFAs stressed 
that 'advice will be more credible if it arises as a product of a wide consensus, and reflects the 
full range of evidence contributed throughout the regions' (HM TREASURY et al., 2005, p. 7). 
A common template was issued setting out how regional advice should be prepared. The 
guidance required that procedures for decision making must be inclusive but did not prescribe 
the process that regions should adopt when preparing their advice.  
 
While regional actors were busy preparing their RFA submissions, the status of the English 
regions was, however, being challenged. Emerging evidence questioned the ‘economic 
dividend of regionalism’ (MORGAN, 2006) and the lack of progress made in meeting the 
Government’s target to reduce economic disparities between regions (BURCH et al., 2008). 
There were increasing pressures from the Treasury, which was concerned that spatial 
disparities in productivity were impeding national economic growth and regional structures 
were criticized as ineffective and lacking leadership (PEARCE and AYRES, 2007). ‘City 
regions’ received increasing attention as a more suitable territorial scale to promote economic 
development (HARRISON, 2010). Though the ‘new city regionalism’ shared the inherent lines 
of weakness that characterized the ‘new regionalism’ (HARRISON, 2007), the agenda attracted 
support in Westminster and Whitehall and the 2006 Local Government White Paper endorsed 




In response, the Government published a Review of Sub-national Economic Development and 
Regeneration (SNR) which sought to identify ways to ‘de-clutter’ the sub-national tier, improve 
the effectiveness and efficiency of regional decision making and assist the Government deliver 
its economic growth targets (HM TREASURY et al., 2007). The Review stated that (i) local 
authorities should be encouraged to promote economic development by pooling resources 
through sub-regional working, (ii) unelected Regional Assemblies should be abolished by 2011 
and (iii) strengthened RDAs made responsible for preparing, in consultation with local 
authorities, new ‘Single Regional Strategies’ (SRSs) (for a comprehensive account of these 
developments see PEARCE and MAWSON, 2009). The SNR was an attempt to simplify the 
messy and contested nature of regional working but was itself littered with inherent 
contradictions and ambiguities (AYRES and STAFFORD, 2009). Once again, the reforms 
were the outcome of departmental wrangling and tradeoffs, characteristic of the ‘politically 
charged processes involved in the production of subnational space’ (HARRISON, 2008, p. 
922).  
 
The Review announced a second round of Regional Funding Allocations that covered the 2008-
2011 spending review period and included, in a limited form, skills policy. Regional 
submissions were to be made by February 2009. This meant that regions were preparing their 
advice amidst the considerable political and institutional uncertainty brought about by the SNR 
reforms. This paper examines the collaborative endeavors of regional actors in an inherently 
complex and contested policy environment and during a particularly turbulent period.  
 




Recent years have witnessed a shift to a more fluid, multi-level form of governance in which 
partnerships and networking take on a new significance (BERARDO and SCHOLTZ, 2010). 
The shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ implies that the nation state can no longer manage 
policy in isolation and instead must work with multiple actors at different spatial scales in order 
to realize objectives (BEVIR and RICHARDS, 2008). The governance model assumes that 
nation states need to access resources and knowledge held by external agencies in order to 
improve policy effectiveness, tailor policies to the specific needs of localities, boost economic 
productivity by building on the productive capacity of localities and increase accountability 
and democratize governance structures. Indeed these assumptions underpin the decision to 
introduce RFAs. RFAs were initiated and driven forward by Treasury officials who believed 
that decentralizing decision making, engaging sub-national partners and allocating resources 
over the long-term would take account of spatial diversity, contribute to boosting regional 
economic productivity and help meet the Public Service Agreement (PSA) target to reduce 
regional economic disparities (HM TREASURY and CABINET OFFICE, 2004). In order to 
achieve this, the Government developed strategic partnerships with a range of public, private 
and non-profit organizations, epitomized by a ‘policy network’ approach.  
 
‘Policy networks’ describe the connections between ‘public policies and their strategic and 
institutional context: the network of public, semi-public and private actors participating in 
certain fields’ (KICKERT et al., 1997, p. 1). In policy networks decision-making takes place 
in complex networks where collective action is viewed as a way of tackling problems that cross 
departmental boundaries and resist the solutions available through the action of one agency - 
so-called ‘wicked issues’ (WEBER and KHADEMIAN, 2009). This has led some to assert that 
the traditional functions of the state are being ‘hollowed out’ (JESSOP, 2004). The retreat of 
the nation state is viewed as a consequence of pressures from above via globalization, from 
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below amidst demands for devolution, and from within due to the revival of free market 
ideologies and the perceived incapacity of the state to manage the economy and maintain 
control over policy outcomes (LABAO et al., 2009).  
 
By contrast, others assert that ‘the centre is still the most powerful actor and the loss of control 
described by the hollowing-out thesis is exaggerated’ (CAIRNEY, 2009, p. 358). As KLIJN 
(2008, p. 509) notes, ‘one can identify many tasks and services that are still performed in a 
bureaucratic setting and in a fairly hierarchical way, making them adhere well to classical 
theories of public administration’. Arrangements and outcomes are also dependent on precisely 
what is being decentralized (e.g. resources, authority and legitimacy) and which actors are 
driving the process (RODRIGUEZ-POSE and GILL, 2003). Indeed, this complex dichotomy 
between the ‘Westminster Model’ and ‘differentiated polity’ (RHODES, 2007) is characteristic 
of UK policy making and significantly impacts on the effectiveness of governance 
arrangements at the sub-national tier (MARSH, 2008; ENTWISTLE, 2010). The empirical 
evidence presented in this paper provides a close examination of the ‘actual mechanisms’ 
(SWYNGEDOUW, 1996) which have shaped inter-governmental relations and 
decentralization in England. By exploring the network management strategies employed by 
regional actors in attempts to negotiate new policy spaces, it is possible to unravel the politics 
of rescaling and explore the intricacies involved in the RFA process.     
 
Using network management to deal with complexity and uncertainty  
 
Network management can offer an effective way to deal with complexity and uncertainty. 
KLIJN et al (2010) note that without adequate network management strategies it is impossible 
to achieve effective outcomes in complex interaction processes. They go on to assert a clear 
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relationship between the number and intensity of applied network management strategies and 
good outcomes. The assumption is, therefore, that if officials operating in the RFA networks 
want to achieve their objectives, they would need to consciously negotiate and manage their 
network environment. FEIOCK (2010) also argues that well managed collective action can 
have considerable benefits for achieving integrated regional policy solutions. But, how is this 
achieved? Two types of network management are identified in the literature - process 
management and institutional design. Process management takes the structure of the network 
as given and focuses on improving the behaviors and interactions between actors in policy 
games (KICKERT et al., 1997). Institutional design seeks to alter the institutional 
characteristics of the network by changing the network composition and/or the formal rules 
that govern interactions and outcomes (KLIJN and KOPPENJAN, 2006). Central government 
dictated the institutional design of the RFA process in terms of setting out the scope and remit 
of the scheme through written guidance (HM TREASURY et al., 2005; 2008). Discretion as to 
how the process was managed was, however, left to regional actors. As such, this paper will 
focus solely on the process management strategies adopted by regional actors in their attempts 
to negotiate and develop their RFA submissions.  
 
KLIJN et al (2010) identify four types of process management strategies (Table 1). Connecting 
strategies are required to start the game and involve identifying and incentivizing actors that 
are crucial to achieving the broad objectives of the network. This can be referred to as ‘selective 
activation’ (SCHOLZ et al., 2008) or, where unproductive partners have to be removed, 
‘deactivation’ (HUXHAM and VANGEN, 2000). Exploring content is necessary to clarify the 
goals and perceptions of actors and create opportunities for actors’ participation (AGRANOFF, 
2006). These strategies are particularly important for managing the difficulties in determining 
the precise nature of the policy problem (KOPPENJAN and KLIJN, 2004). Strategies for 
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arranging involve setting up structures for consultation and interaction. Structures need to be 
as streamlined as possible to avoid high collaborative costs (HUXHAM and VANGEN, 2005) 
but must attempt to adhere to principles of good governance (BANG and ESMARK, 2009; 
EDELENBOS et al., 2009) and maintain the goodwill and support of network participants. 
Finally, process agreements involve strategies that set the rules for interaction and protect 
actors’ core values (ROBINS, 2008). These rules provide a degree of stability and reciprocity 
in the network that shape actors’ behaviors and responses (DE LEON and VARDA, 2009).  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
  
Measuring effectiveness in policy networks 
 
Measuring the effectiveness of network management strategies and collaborative outcomes is 
potentially problematic due to the fact that actors have different goals and aspirations that may 
change over time. KOPPENJAN (2008, p. 705) argues that ‘the more a policy situation 
resembles the characteristics of networks - complexity, interdependencies, dynamics - the 
greater the risk that the disadvantages of using ex ante performance measures will manifest 
themselves’. Likewise, VOETS et al (2008, p. 774) suggest that in order to comprehend the 
performance of complex networks ‘we need to leave the beaten track of the traditional 
performance literature’ and its focus on hard performance measures and adopt a framework 
that takes account of public principles such as capacity building and democratic quality 
(MATHUR and SKELCHER, 2007). One way to achieve this is to take ex post realized 
solutions as a starting point ‘by asking actors during and after the interaction process to what 
degree they are satisfied with the solutions that have been reached’ (KOPPENJAN, 2008, p. 
702). In this paper, actors’ perceptions of realized outcomes have been used to determine the 
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effectiveness of the RFA network, rather than objective ex ante measures. Indeed, using ‘hard 
performance measures’ to determine the effectiveness of regional governance structures in 
England is recognized as being prone to misinterpretation, manipulation and inaccuracy 
(PEARCE and AYRES, 2009).    
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
KLIJN et al (2010) also make a helpful distinction between content outcomes and process 
outcomes, which might be used to categorize specific areas of success and failure in 
collaborative endeavors (Table 2). Indeed, the content outcomes are highly relevant to the RFA 
network where the institutional design set by Whitehall emphasized the need for innovative, 
integrated, consensus based approaches to the long-term management of resources at the sub-
national tier. The process outcomes are also applicable to the RFA network in terms of 
assessing the quality of interactions between partners and their ability to reach a consensus and 
resolve inevitable policy tensions (HM TREASURY et al, 2005; 2008). KLIJN et al (2010) 
operationalize their framework through a regression analysis of survey responses from network 
members to identify potential correlations between process management strategies and content 
and process outcomes. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this study. Instead, this paper 
identifies the network strategies that are most prevalent in attempts to manage vertical and 
horizontal relationships in regional governance networks in England. Moreover, it draws on 
the content and process outcomes outlined in Table 2 to examine the success and failures of 
these strategies in meeting key regional objectives.   
 





This research has adopted KOPPENJAN and KLIJN’s (2004) actor, game and network 
analysis to provide an overview of the conditions and circumstances within which complex 
decision making has taken place in the English regions. An actor analysis involves identifying 
actors, problems, perceptions and dependencies. The analysis of the game focuses on two 
aspects: identifying the arenas where actors make relevant decisions and analyzing stagnation 
or ‘collaborative inertia’ (HUXHAM, 2003). A network analysis involves looking at the 
institutional context by exploring the interactions between actors and the rules of the game. 
Interaction patterns reflect the frequency and variety of contacts and can be used to make 
judgements about levels of inclusivity and information transfer. Rules of the game can be both 
formal and informal and shape the types of behaviours and strategies employed within 
networks. This analysis provides ‘a map of the policy environment’ (KOPPENJAN and KLIJN, 
2004, p. 134), which has been used to  identify the types of network management strategies 
employed by regional actors in attempts to manage (i) vertical relationships with central 
government and (ii) horizontal relationships with regional counterparts.  
 
During Summer 2008 face-to-face interviews were conducted with regional actors working on 
RFAs in England’s South East (20 interviewees) and North East (23 interviewees) regions. 
These regions were selected on the basis of their distinct characteristics. The North East is a 
Labour-dominated region with a legacy of joint working aimed at tackling the region’s 
economic weaknesses. The South East was selected as a Conservative-led region, with 
difficulties in achieving consensus between its 74 local authorities around the challenges 
associated with economic growth. Senior officials were interviewed from RDAs, GOs, 
unelected Regional Assemblies, local government and social and economic partners. Between 
September 2008 and March 2009 an online survey in the remaining six English regions (outside 
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London) was conducted, involving closed and open questions. The same sample frame as the 
case studies was utilized. 324 requests were sent, 108 responses received, a response rate of 
33%. Interview and survey respondents were asked about their organizational objectives and 
aspirations for the RFA scheme, institutional structures and processes for making decisions on 
RFAs and satisfaction with outcomes.  
 
Respondents were also asked to identify the key challenges that they felt were most significant 
in meeting RFA objectives (Table 3). These are used to conceptualize the complexity and 
uncertainty faced by regional actors in managing the RFA network. They are policy specific 
but give a feel for the type of collaborative complexities faced in contemporary policy networks 
(KOPPENJAN AND KLIJN, 2004) and have been used to frame the empirical analysis in 
Section five of this paper. Interviews were digitally recorded, transcribed and analyzed using 
NVIVO. Survey data was analyzed using SPSS and responses were cross-tabulated by (i) 
region (ii) policy area and (iii) organization. 
 
A detailed analysis of the precise structures and mechanisms evident in each region or the 
intricacies of regional variation based on socio-political and economic legacies is beyond the 
scope of this paper. The involvement of multiple actors across four different policy sectors in 
each region makes this a particularly complex area. Instead, the intention is to present the 
network management strategies and behaviors that were prevalent across all regions, while 
identifying unique regional examples when relevant to particular findings.   
 
MANAGING COMPLEXITY AND UNCERTAINTY IN REGIONAL GOVERNANCE 




The following analysis examines how regional actors sought to manage the complexity and 
uncertainty epitomized by the key challenges in Table 3.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Managing Vertical Relations  
 
Levels of government support 
 
The RFA scheme had the potential to deliver enhanced regional discretion but 47% of survey 
respondents felt that a lack of support across government departments threatened to undermine 
this objective. In particular, many agreed that Whitehall departments had not communicated 
their support for virement (transferring funds between budget headings).  
 
‘You can do all the prioritizing and joining up that you want at a regional level but if 
you are stuck with a fiercely centralist and departmentalist approach at the Centre then 
it will ultimately founder’ (East of England RDA official).  
 
Many regional actors acknowledged that in the absence of an elected regional tier it remained 
difficult for government to devolve significant powers and resources. Concerns over 
‘democratic anchorage’ (EDELENBOS and KLIJN, 2009) were seen to prevent Whitehall 
from decentralizing because of doubts about democratic accountability. Nonetheless, the 
majority of respondents agreed that an enhanced dialogue with departments had helped to bring 
attention to the need for greater sub-national discretion. Some actors felt that the RFA scheme 
reflected a degree of commitment to decentralization in parts of Whitehall, which could be 
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built upon through demonstrating competence and trust (KLIJN et al., 2007). Although the 
scope of RFAs was limited, the scheme was welcomed as evidence of a shared objective to 
enhance sub-national discretion, which regional partners were eager to build upon over the 
longer term. Regions were also using new information and research to make the case for sub-
national policy making, as an RDA official in the South West indicated,  
 
‘We were concerned about some of the signals coming out from Whitehall about our 
suggestions but we sensed that our best chance of moving minds at the Centre would 
be to undertake more technical work, build an evidence base and present something 
with strong support across the region’. 
 
Research was, therefore, used to facilitate interaction and explore the scope for regional 
flexibilities. Many interviewees referred to the need to ‘know how to play the game with civil 
servants’ (South West Assembly official) and adopted an informal approach based on face-to-
face contacts and ad hoc arrangements. For example, officials in the South East, North East 
and East of England regions informally presented what they believed to be strong cases for 
virement to relevant government departments before detailing the proposals in their final 
submissions. This was an attempt to present alternative solutions to Whitehall and maintaining 
flexibility in negotiations. However, in all instances individual departments refused, fearing 
that their funds might be siphoned to meeting other departments’ activities. This resulted in 
early fixations and stagnation within Whitehall and the issue appeared non-negotiable. The 
outcome was that no region formally made the case for virement in their final submissions, 





‘Even if we had come up with something fully propositioned, evidence based and 
supported across the region, the Government would not support virement so what was 
the point?’  
 
In these instances, regional partners recognized that making any case for virement would 
involve tough negotiations and they were not willing to jeopardize regional relationships over 
something they felt Whitehall would never authorize. As a senior GO official in the North East 
commented, ‘virement would have destroyed our regional partnerships and it was considered 
a step too far’. These conflict avoidance strategies might have protected collaborative 
governance arrangements but did not help to achieve ‘content’ outcomes in terms of 
demonstrating effective problem solving, innovation and integrative policy solutions. 
Moreover, because RFAs represented pots of money already allocated via the Spending Review 
process, funds were strongly linked to national targets and priorities. This made it hugely 
difficult for regional actors to engender discretion at the sub-national tier, particularly given 
the reluctance of Whitehall departments to consider virement (SQW, 2006).  
 
 
Level of funds available 
 
The level of funds available were viewed as the biggest challenge facing regional actors in 
terms of developing their RFA submissions. Funding allocations amounted to £7.6bn in 
2009/10 (economic development £2.2bn, housing £3.3bn, transport £2.1bn). While significant, 
this represented just 14% of total public expenditure in the three policy areas and 1.5% of 
public expenditure in the regions (HM TREASURY and NATIONAL STATISTICS, 2009). 
There was overt and formal disquiet amongst regional stakeholders about the perceived lack of 
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resources (IN HOUSE POLICY CONSULTANCY, 2005). However, those charged with 
facilitating the process often sought to prevent partners from becoming disenchanted ‘by 
focusing on how the process should be organized and not the content of the problem’ 
(KOPPENJAN and KLIJN, 2004, p. 246). In doing so they adopted a strategy that aimed to 
maintain the support and commitment of relevant partners, as a North East Assembly official 
described, 
 
‘We publicly welcomed the RFAs as a move in the right direction. We had to do that 
to maintain the commitment and support of key actors. However, in quiet we were not 
happy with the narrow focus and levels of resources that we were given but we had to 
keep the momentum going somehow’.  
 
In other regions, actors indicated that the low levels of funds ‘forced the region to think more 
innovatively about overall investment opportunities’ (Yorkshire and Humber local authority 
official). Key actors were forced to overcome historical disagreements over policy through the 
formulation of new agendas that sought to challenge existing ways of thinking and avoid the 
deadlocks that might result from insufficient resources. A third issue regarding funds was a 
perceived lack of clarity in the Government’s guidance. A number of respondents suggested 
that there was some confusion about the types of schemes that might be funded through the 
exercise. All regions, in some form or another, sought advice from Whitehall to clarify the 
rules of the game - although some sought to manipulate the situation by interpreting advice in 
ways that suited their own purpose. For example, government guidance requested that the 
regions’ advice incorporate a potential 10% variation in available funding to account for 
potential changes in the Government’s eventual expenditure plans. The inclusion of this 
measure was aimed at ensuring that spending priorities remained ‘flexible’ in terms of future 
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spending scenarios. However, ‘it probably suited some regions not to recognize this until quite 
late in the process and assume that there was 10% extra up for grabs and base their prioritization 
on this’ (South East RDA official).  
 
In summary, regions were being asked to prioritize investment decisions but they only had 
control over a small percentage of total regional public expenditure. Limited funds were the 
biggest cause of disagreement between actors, leading to territorial competition between 
geographies about where investment should go (RODRIGUEZ-POSE, 2009). In response, 
some actors pursued inventive policy solutions, while others sought to manipulate government 
guidance in a bid to maximize funding allocations, underlining the need for effective 
‘institutional design’ to establish clear and robust rules of the game (KLIJN AND 




Regions were granted seven months to develop their RFA submissions, a timescale that many 
stakeholders felt was ‘inadequate and undermined the quality of evidence gathering and the 
ability to reach an informed consensus’ (West Midlands voluntary sector official). In order to 
meet the tight timescale, in all regions, a small number of key actors were selected who would 
drive the process forward and be responsible for delivering submissions on time. Regional 
actors were in agreement that the timescales did not provide time for consultation with the full 
range of stakeholders and, in most instances a degree of openness and transparency was 
sacrificed in a bid to move the agenda forward. In an effort to avoid the ‘large numbers 
problem’ (SCHARPF, 1993) small teams of regional technical experts and senior officials 
examined the details and made tough decisions around prioritization. A final draft was then 
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approved by formal Regional Boards and Forums to provide a degree of democratic legitimacy 
and accountability. This scenario highlights the complexity involved in balancing broad 
consultation and consensus while meeting tight policy deadlines.  
 
Securing regional discretion 
 
72% of survey respondents agreed that the RFA scheme provided scope for greater regional 
discretion over spending priorities. However, 88% also expressed a more cynical view that 
central government was motivated by a desire to get regions to make tough decisions, 
effectively removing responsibility for unpopular decisions from Whitehall control.  
 
‘The rhetoric was around giving increased substance to regionalism but I suspect that a 
large part of the real politik was getting ownership of tough decisions out of Whitehall 
and into other public bodies’ (South East RDA official).   
 
This indicates a degree of mistrust between governance tiers that threatened to undermine the 
goodwill and spirit of collaboration necessary to secure critical reflection and robust and 
sustainable content outcomes. This mistrust was fuelled in the North East, for example, when 
evidence based priorities about the use of housing funds were overridden by national objectives 
at a late stage in the process. 
 
‘In the North East we felt that 50% of the housing pot should be used for the 
regeneration and improvement of the existing housing stock. That got overtaken by a 
very strong indication from the Minister for Housing that no matter what the regional 
evidence her overriding priority was to meet the Government’s target to build new 
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affordable houses. That resulted in some very difficult negotiations just before the final 
submission that was not good for relations’ (North East GO official).   
 
This intervention from central government undermined months of collaborative effort in the 
region and resulted in an embarrassing U-turn that damaged the goodwill and commitment of 
stakeholders. As a North East Business respondent indicated, ‘it gives you the feeling that 
Whitehall doesn’t trust the region to do anything for itself’. Indeed, regions were often able to 
articulate and discuss more radical proposals that reflected territorial needs. However, 
Whitehall’s inability to overcome its propensity for centralism (JONES and STEWART, 2010) 
removed the incentive for regions to propose anything formally.  
 
On a more encouraging note, officials in all regions viewed transport policy as the ‘big prize’ 
in the RFA scheme. For the first time, RFAs provided an opportunity for regions to identify 
transport priorities linked to investment, providing scope for more systematic transport 
planning at the regional level (DFT, 2006). The RFA process had the potential to open up 
conflict between the Department for Transport (DfT) and the regions. However, to the contrary, 
DfT accepted 98% of the advice presented (FAULKNER, 2006). There was also a view that 
the RFA exercise had actually led to a reduction in tensions between local and regional actors 
and the Centre due to increased openness and transparency. Indeed, for the most part, the 
process was viewed as highly positive, leading to enhanced inter-governmental relations, the 
transformation of regional ‘wish lists’ into strategic priorities and a more consensual and 
evidence based approach to identifying viable transport schemes. The example of transport 
policy demonstrates that with the right institutional design decentralized decision making can 








57% of survey respondents agreed that reaching a consensus over investment decisions was a 
significant challenge. Nonetheless, different actors tended to view one another as important 
and 84% of survey respondents said that they had adequate opportunity to engage, indicating 
good levels of openness and inclusivity in the process. When bringing key actors together there 
was recognition that partners needed to be incentivized in different ways. For example, a GO 
official in the North East noted that,  
 
‘The business sector is central to negotiations but they are not interested in the 
bureaucracy evident in public bodies. They are busy and we need to engage them in 
imaginative ways that are not too arduous’. 
 
This point was echoed by a local authority official in the region who indicated that they had set 
up informal events to allow business officials to engage in discussions in a way that avoided 
lengthy bureaucratic meetings. These arranging strategies were aimed at being flexible to allow 
the involvement of key individuals but often meant that much of the discussion on RFAs took 
place outside formal meetings. There were noted differences in the ways informal and social 
networks operated in the North and South East regions. The South East was described by an 
RDA official as a ‘big and contested region, which makes it difficult to decide who runs the 
show and get all partners together simultaneously’. A strategy of selective activation and 
deactivation was often employed to generate a ‘tight knit group of individuals, who trusted one 
another, knew the issues and could facilitate interactions’ (South East local authority official). 
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By contrast, the North East is a small region with a strong regional identity and legacy of 
partnership working. Key actors were in close proximity and tended to know one another, thus 
facilitating more frequent and intense relationships.         
 
The role of trust and informality was widespread in all regions, regardless of size or 
composition. For example, 77% of survey respondents stated that they regularly participated 
in informal face-to-face meetings about RFAs. For example, a South East GO official noted 
that,  
 
‘We should not underestimate the importance of those one-to-one meetings because 
sometimes they are a better opportunity for senior executives to say “we are worried 
about this or I’m not happy with that or this needs to happen”, which they would never 
say in a meeting outside of that. We use those type of meetings very effectively to 
ensure that we have the right influence over the process.’ 
 
Indeed, in all regions there appeared to be some kind of high-level, executive group that 
operated at an informal level, as an Assembly official in the North East commented,  
 
‘If you want to push the boundaries and scope potentially innovative policy then formal 
meetings are not the best place to do this. You need to run it past key individuals first, 
get support from strategically important people who can champion the proposal and 
then put it to a wider audience’.  
 
This type of arranging strategy offered a way to search for synergies between actors in an 
informal way. Indeed, survey respondents agreed that strong leadership (94%), informal 
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negotiations between parties (83%) and a robust evidence base (76%) were the most important 
mechanisms for resolving disagreements and overcoming stagnation in partnerships. More 
formal mechanisms, such as voting were considered the least effective means of conflict 
mediation. Visible leadership from key individuals was seen to bring coherence and 
consistency to proceedings and allowed innovative solutions and tough decisions to be 
brokered (VANGEN and HUXHAM, 2003).  
 
However, while informality might be useful for actors at the centre of the network, those at the 
periphery were less engaged. Some regional officials suggested that individuals might not have 
understood the full implications of what they were asked to ‘sign off’ in formal Regional 
Boards or Forums, threatening the transparency and legitimacy of regional decision making. 
However, the process was defended by a local government official in the South West who 
argued that ‘the RFA network is hugely complex and busy public officials have not got the 
time, energy or responsibility to keep pace with all the details, so delegating responsibility to 
a small select group was the only option’. Another source for concern was a perception that 
informal meetings were used to ensure that political deals were struck ‘to ensure that everyone 
got a slice of the cake’ (East of England GO official). Despite claims of evidence based 
rationality and objectivity, there was a view that deals had been brokered behind closed doors 





A broad commitment to policy integration was evident across all regions but 66% of 
respondents agreed that there was a lack of constructive dialogue across policy sectors. As a 
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consequence, it was broadly acknowledged that the separate strands of the RFA scheme 
(economic development, housing, transport and skills) were largely developed in isolation. In 
most regions the high-level, executive groups were often tasked with looking across the 
separate strands to facilitate coordination in the final submission. However, by the time this 
occurred, the tough negotiations around prioritization within each of the sectors had already 
taken place, leaving minimal scope for manoeuvre. As an official in the North East indicated,  
 
‘The Steering Group met at the end of the process but, by that time, it was too late to 
consider how to coordinate investment across the sectors in any meaningful way. 
Ideally we need to think about integration from the outset but departmental positions 
didn’t really give us much incentive to do so’. 
 
There was a view amongst some officials that greater flexibility was required to avoid early 
fixations over priority setting. This might have allowed greater scope to consider the long-term 
management of resources in a more joined up and strategic way. Nonetheless, the biggest 
stumbling block again proved to be a lack of commitment across Whitehall departments to 
pursue this goal. Once again, regional priorities were constrained by national objectives and 
departmental positions that prevented a more holistic approach to policy making at the sub-
national tier. 
 
Utilizing regional evidence  
 
Regions were required to produce evidence based proposals but they often faced a complex 
dilemma between producing evidence ‘fit for purpose’ and ‘information overload’. On the one 
hand, building a comprehensive evidence base was viewed as essential to promote critical 
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reflection, search for goal alignment and enhance transparency and openness in proceedings. 
It informed network participants and provided a basis on which to make robust decisions. By 
contrast, other regional officials felt that gathering evidence was used as an avoidance strategy 
to evade making final decisions. On occasions actors were insistent on seeing evidence that 
‘their scheme’ was not viable even though the evidence was not available or not feasible to 
produce. As a North East business official indicated, 
 
‘Where there is not enough evidence the decision has to be taken about whether there 
is a valid case for generating some. It is often difficult for losers in negotiations to 
accept outcomes in the absence of robust evidence but you can’t produce evidence for 
everything.’  
 
One area, however, where evidence was used effectively was transport policy. Most regions 
had opted to commission consultants, largely paid by DfT, to generate prioritization 
methodologies for the transport strand of RFA submissions. Methodologies varied across the 
regions but most involved assessing whether schemes (i) contributed to regional objectives, (ii) 
represented value for money and (iii) were deliverable. In most instances, key personnel 
working on transport submissions rallied to get different stakeholders and partners signed up 
to the logic underpinning the methodology. Then, once all the data had been processed, 
stakeholders were under pressure to accept the outcomes whether they liked it or not. An 
official in the West Midlands described the process,  
  
‘Transport methodologies were used to bring objectivity to decisions and it helped to 
remove some of the politics from negotiations. Methodologies were used as a way to 
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persuade reluctant local authority officials to sign off proposals even if their area did 
not feature.’   
 
This point was echoed by a North East local government official who cited the example of a 
local authority leader who ‘had signed off priorities that had no benefit to his council despite 
years of lobbying’. The evidence emanating from the transport methodologies provided the 
justification to go back to his authority and defend his decision. Providing a clear evidence 
base and enhancing fiscal transparency are seen as a ‘means of improving economic 
governance arrangements’ (HEALD, 2003, p. 723). Indeed, the case of transport policy is 
illustrative of this. In other areas, however, the quality of regional statistics and data has been 
criticized as insufficient and inaccurate, raising questions about the efficacy of an evidence 
based approach to regional policy making (AUDIT COMMISSION, 2007). 
  
Political & economic climate 
 
The reforms outlined in the Sub-national Review (HM TREASURY et al, 2007) resulted in a 
high degree of uncertainty and institutional repositioning at a time when regions were asked to 
develop RFA submissions.   
 
‘Do not underestimate the turmoil that the SNR is causing. There is huge uncertainty 
about the lack of decisions and timescales regarding implementing the reforms. As an 
organization we are talking more about the SNR reforms and not the day job. We are 
dealing with RFAs but in a position of transition and uncertainty and it makes life much 




This uncertainty was compounded by the forthcoming 2010 General Election. In opposition, 
the Conservative Party set out proposals to remove the regional tier and empower localities 
(CONSERVATIVE PARTY, 2009). Regions were, therefore, being asked to produce 
integrated and strategic approaches to the long-term management of resources when regional 
structures themselves might not survive a change in government. The South East region is 
dominated by Conservative local councils who began to play a political game by refusing to 
engage with regional structures in the belief that a Conservative government would soon be 
elected and functions transferred to localities. These conflicting strategies were used as a way 
to stall regional negotiations and, as essential partners in providing democratic legitimacy, this 
caused significant unrest.  
 
‘The SNR and prospect of a change in government in the near future is a huge kick in 
the teeth to the way in which things have been done in the region and local government 
is now utterly united in its intention to resist working regionally’ (South East RDA 
official).    
 
Key actors in the region attempted to overcome competing organizational objectives by trying 
to remove the politics out of negotiations and reassert a ‘focus on the technical and evidence 
based aspects of the RFA scheme that would offer genuine benefits to localities in the region’ 
(South East GO official). Enough progress was made to keep negotiations on track but the 
commitment and goodwill between actors had undoubtedly waned. Once again, a premium was 
placed on leadership. For example, formal rules were ‘bent’ to allow Chairs of relevant boards 
to stay in post during this turbulent period, provide a degree of continuity and ‘keep the show 




By contrast, the North East is dominated by Labour councils and their response was markedly 
different. Local authority leaders sought strong and effective leadership in a bid to enhance 
productive relations between local authorities and other partners. Negotiations were not free 
from conflict but there was a continued desire to demonstrate the added value of regional 
working in a way that was not evident in the South East. Although relations were arguably less 
fraught than in the South East, the macro political and economic environment made ‘it 
extremely difficult to adopt a strategic game plan’ (North East RDA official). Moreover, the 
impact of the economic downturn was making the reconfiguration of public finances more 
likely and, as a consequence, the RFA exercise potentially obsolete. This undoubtedly 
undermined the incentive for actors in all regions to engage. Partners did not want to invest 
time and energy in a process where tangible content outcomes looked increasingly doubtful. 
 
The effectiveness of network strategies for managing vertical and horizontal relationships  
 
The key challenges identified above highlight the complexity and uncertainty evident in the 
RFA network. The following analysis explores the effectiveness of different network 
management strategies in overcoming these challenges. Strategies are considered successful 
where the challenges were overcome and, by contrast, unsuccessful where the challenges 
remained an obstacle to achieving RFA objectives.   
 
Regional actors employed a range of network management strategies in a bid to realize network 
objectives, but with varying success. Strategies for exploring content were perhaps the most 
prevalent. These were important in trying to make the case to Whitehall for greater regional 
discretion and for generating a horizontal consensus within regions. The pervasiveness of 
strategies for exploring content was perhaps a consequence of the constantly changing political, 
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institutional and economic environment, which required actors to repeatedly redefine goals, 
aspirations and objectives. Network management strategies were judged effective in generating 
a degree of consensus within regions and there was clear evidence of ‘buy in’ and inclusivity 
across all regions. The role of informality and face-to-face contacts were viewed as extremely 
important. Although a great deal of emphasis was placed on informal processes and ‘elite’ 
groups, this was largely viewed as an inevitable part of the process given the complexity of 
policy decisions and limited timescales and respondents were largely satisfied with their level 
of involvement. Strong leadership was also perceived as imperative and the effective use of 
evidence to promote critical reflection was demonstrated, particularly in the case of transport 
policy. The strategies adopted by regional actors proved fruitful in overcoming disagreements 
and breaking deadlocks within regions and respondents were generally satisfied that they had 
‘done the best job possible given the policy parameters’ (East Midlands GO official). In this 
regard, regional actors were largely successful in realizing the process outcomes outlined in 
Table 2.  
 
In relation to content outcomes, the effective involvement of actors in networks was secured. 
Regions were also able to demonstrate effective problem solving capacity and, in many 
instances, discussed potentially integrative and innovative policy solutions. However, the 
prominence of national targets and Whitehall’s reluctance to vire funds meant that these 
proposals did not feature in final submissions. Securing tangible content outcomes in these core 
areas was, therefore, undermined. The institutional design imposed by government did not have 
the full backing of participating departments and this significantly damaged the ability of 
regional actors to secure content outcomes. Moreover, the constant political and institutional 
uncertainty brought about by the SNR reforms and subsequent change in government rendered 
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the sustainability and cost effectiveness of the exercise highly questionable. Indeed, managing 
these variables was beyond the scope of the regional network management strategies available.  
 
Findings indicate that while regional actors were largely successful in managing the challenges 
associated with horizontal relations, they did not have the policy levers at their disposal to 
overcome the challenges associated with vertical relations with Whitehall. RFAs represented 
another example of ‘centrally orchestrated regionalism’ (HARRISON, 2008) where sub-
national actors were given responsibility for policy development and delivery but without 
genuine control over associated powers and funds. The lack of cross departmental commitment 
to the RFA scheme underlined reservations about granting genuine territorial discretion at the 
Centre (AYRES and PEARCE, 2005). As PIKE and TOMANEY (2009, p. 29) argue, 
decentred and networked forms of governance appear ‘to downplay the shadow of the nation 
state and the instrumental role of such a framework pushing down responsibility to lower 
institutions without concomitant shifts in authority and resources’.  
 
Moreover, the lack of political legitimacy in the English regions and ‘a devolutionary process 
where the central government holds the upper hand’ (RODRIGUEZ-POSE and GILL, 2003, 
p. 335) resulted in a weak bargaining position for regional actors in their negotiations with the 
Centre. This significantly limited their ability to achieve content outcomes in the form of 
genuine sub-national discretion. Despite government rhetoric of rationality and evidence based 
policy in the RFA guidance, our findings confirms that efforts to decentralize were the product 
of political wrangling and turf wars as new institutions and policy spaces were negotiated 
within and between governance tiers (DEAS and WARD, 2000). A close examination of the 
RFA process reveals that very little was being truly decentralized (e.g. resources, authority and 
legitimacy) and that funding decisions and authority remained firmly at the Centre. The notion 
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of ‘hollowing out’ implies a process of organizational and institutional ‘filling in’ at other 
spatial scales (JONES et al., 2005) but there was limited evidence of this regards the RFA 




This paper has explored the effectiveness of network management strategies for dealing with 
complexity and uncertainty in regional governance networks. The findings presented have 
important implications for methodology, theory and practice. First, methodologically it 
underlines the value of detailed empirical analysis of regional responses to decentralization, 
which has helped to illuminate the ‘actual mechanisms’ (SWYNGEDOUW, 1996) leading to 
success and failure. It also confirms that KOPPENJAN and KLIJN’s (2004) actor, game and 
network analysis is an effective tool for evaluating the quality of regional decision making, 
allowing for international comparisons regarding the use of the model in network research. In 
terms of theory, KLIJN et al (2010) assert that there is limited academic literature examining 
the relationship between network management strategies and outcomes. This paper seeks to 
contribute to this debate by identifying the network management strategies employed in 
regional governance networks and linking these to process and content outcomes. Findings also 
confirm the dominance of hierarchy in territorial networks in England. Contrary to the notions 
of multi-level governance, evidence suggests that the scope for sub-national influence is firmly 
defined and even the most considered network management strategies are unable to counteract 
this prevailing force. In the absence of an appropriate institutional design, set by central 




These findings also have important implications for policy. Elected in May 2010, the Coalition 
government has abolished regional governance structures and established Local Enterprise 
Partnerships (LEPs), consisting of groupings of local authorities and business partners, based 
upon ‘natural’ economic areas. LEPs are charged with ‘improving the coordination of public 
and private investment in transport, housing, skills, regeneration and other areas of economic 
development’ (HM TREASURY, 2010, p.31). The policy challenges, traits and relationships 
evident in regional policy networks are, therefore, likely to be replicated at a sub-regional level. 
At a process level there is a continued emphasis on effective cross sector partnership working, 
managing vertical and horizontal intergovernmental relations and balancing competing 
organisational objectives in key policy areas, such as economic development. As regards 
outcomes there remains an emphasis on policy integration and innovation, consensus building 
and evidenced based solutions. These similarities in network characteristics or ‘structural 
signatures’ (DE LEON and VARDA, 2009) provide scope for lesson drawing.  
 
The latest reforms involve a shift to sub-regional and local structures as a way of promoting 
economic development. HARRISON (2007), however, suggests that a period of critical 
reflection is required before jumping into new assumptions about appropriate geographical 
scales for policy development. Nonetheless, the speed with which the Coalition has removed 
the regional tier raises questions about the underpinning rationale, robustness and longevity of 
these reforms that may prove no more durable than their predecessors. Concerns over a lack of 
strategic direction at the Centre, the prevalence of national targets, reluctance in Whitehall to 
cede genuine control to sub-national actors, a severe lack of funds and turf wars within and 
between governance tiers have undermined decentralization initiatives since the start of New 




Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Coalition’s most recent package of reforms provides little 
indication that current attempts will buck this trend (JONES and STEWART, 2010). The same 
weaknesses that have survived previous transitions from localism, regionalism, city-
regionalism and now ‘new localism’ are, therefore, likely to remain, albeit at a different spatial 
scale (DEAS and WARD, 2000). Most notably, questions remain about the extent to which 
local structures will have the necessary capacity, powers, funding and geographic coverage to 
enable the long-term, strategic management of core policy areas (SQW, 2010; CENTRE FOR 
CITIES, 2010; PUGALIS, 2010; JOHNSON and SCHMUECKER, 2010). The ‘bottom-up’ 
approach adopted by the Coalition has led to the creation of a relatively fragmented tier of 
thirty eight LEPs, some with overlapping boundaries and a small number of local authorities 
left out of the process altogether (DBIS, 2011). Furthermore, the £1.4 billion Regional Growth 
Fund (RGF), announced alongside the LEPs to help those areas particularly affected by public 
spending cuts, has been criticised as insufficient to have any real impact on boosting economic 
productivity (DENHAM, 2010).  
 
In conclusion, historical partnership legacies cannot be ignored when managing the transition 
to new forms territorial governance. It is vital that lessons from the past are harnessed so that 
actors at all governance levels can learn from past successes and failures. Our findings indicate 
that without significantly addressing the stark imbalances of power between the state and sub-
national actors, real decentralization of authority, power and resources will remain elusive. 
Even the most considered sub-national network management strategies will have limited value 
in an environment where central government remains reluctant to cede power and control. The 
lesson for central government is that it needs to engender an ‘institutional design’ (KLIJN and 
KOPPENJAN, 2006) that allows sub-national actors to actively manage and determine 
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spatially distinct policy solutions. If it does not, there is a very real danger that the same 
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Main strategies in 
literature 
Description  
Connecting Selective (de)activation of 
actors 
Engaging or purposefully excluding actors in the network 
 Resource mobilizing Utilizing resources in pursuit of network aims (e.g. human, 
financial, expertise, legitimacy)  
 (De) coupling   Bringing partners together where synergies possible or separating  
partners where interaction is potentially damaging  
 Initiating new interactions Providing opportunities for contact between relevant partners 
 Coalition building Pursuing collaborative efforts with a view to achieving 
organizational and/or network outcomes 
 Mediation  Helping partners to reach agreement or overcome tensions 
 Removing obstacles to co-
operation 
Overcoming potential barriers to collaboration, e.g. cost, time, 
logistics, granting authority 
 Creating incentives for co-
operation 
Identifying incentives to attract partners to engage, e.g. access to 
information, key actors, convenient meetings  
Exploring 
content 
Searching for goal 
congruency  
Looking for synergies & shared objectives 
 Creating variation in 
solutions 
Identifying & exploring a range of network/policy outcomes 
 Furthering goal 
intertwinement 
Exploring how collaborative efforts might be intensified 
 Creating substantive 
variety 
Looking for win-win solutions to maximize actors’ satisfaction 
with network outcomes 
49 
 
 Breaking through the 
asymmetric nature of 
policy debates 
Overcoming traditional/established differences between 
conflicting actors 
 Prevent premature 
cognitive fixations   
Avoid early assumptions about network objectives, behaviors & 
outcomes that might prevent progress 
 Cognitive reflection   
 
Thinking reflexively about organizational &/or network objectives 
& outcomes 
 Managing & collecting 
research 
Utilizing research to achieve organization and/or network 
objectives 
 Creating variation through 
creative competition 
Introducing new actors/objectives/resources to enhance options & 
diversity within the network 
Arranging Creating new & ad hoc 
organizational 
arrangements 
Establishing appropriate institutional structures & procedures to 
facilitate network interactions 
Process 
agreements 
Rules for entrance into or 
exit from the process 
Establishing rules for network membership & exit 
 Avoiding early fixations Avoid perceptual blockages that prevent collaborative endeavor  
 Managing stagnation Overcoming deadlocks & a lack of partnership progress  
 Conflict avoidance Removing or limiting the possibility of conflict between actors 
 Clarifying the rules of the 
game 
Making clear the rules that govern network behaviors  
 Openness, transparency & 
accountability 
Ensure that network rules & procedures promote awareness 
amongst partners & clear lines of accountability in the network 
 Avoidance strategies Behaviors that avoid making a commitment to other partners or 
network objectives  
 Rules that specify the 
interests of actors 
Clarifying actors’ motivations & interests 
 Conflicting strategies 
 
Behaviors that are purposefully antagonistic 
Note: For a comprehensive description of these strategies see KLIJN et al (2010) and KOPPENJAN and KLIJN 
(2004) 














The way in which the network has integrated different policy areas (e.g. economic 
development, housing, transport and skills) 
Actors’ 
contribution 




The extent to which the solutions address the problem 
Robustness of 
results 
The sustainability of results in the future 
Costs & 
benefits 






Levels of satisfaction amongst actors about their involvement in consultations 
Conflict 
resolution 
The way in which conflicts have been averted and/or solved 
Stagnations 
 





The way in which differences in objectives and perceptions have been reconciled 
Frequency of 
contact 
Frequency of contact between actors in the network 
Support for 
outcomes 
The extent to which actors are satisfied with the final results 





Table 3. Collaborative challenges in meeting the objectives of the   
Regional Funding Allocation process 
 






Levels of commitment to the RFA scheme varied across individual government 
departments  
Level of funds 
available 
The level of funding allocated to the scheme was viewed as inadequate  




Regions’ ability to make decisions free from Whitehall control was viewed as marginal 
Horizontal relations  




Regions’ ability to integrate policy sectors (economic development, transport & skills) 
was viewed with skepticism  
Utilizing regional 
evidence 
Questions were raised about the quality and utilization of regional evidence  
Political & 
economic climate  
The Sub-national Review reforms & economic downturn resulted in a high degree of 
uncertainty regards the future trajectory of English regional governance 
 
 
